- “First… it appears that the U.S. nuclear command system was not so tightly coupled so as to prevent recovery from the serious nuclear weapons incidents that did develop during the crisis… The false warnings that did occur did not immediately or automatically produce a reaction that could not be terminated prior to war… The nuclear command system was designed to be more tightly coupled than it turned out to be. For example, the Strategic Air Command was supposed to launch the bombers, under failsafe procedures, before nuclear weapons were predicted to detonate on U.S. soil. SAC, however, failed to do this during the October 28 “test tape” warning incident. There was clearly some slack in this system; but a large part of it was not there by design.” (p. 154)
Lesson: The nuclear command system’s alert system was designed to be more tightly coupled to nuclear alerts than it turned out to be.
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- “There was an element of good luck involved in avoiding accidental war in October 1962… It would be going too far to argue that the successful outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was, to borrow Dean Acheson’s phrase, “a homage to plain dumb luck.” It is nonetheless frightening to recognize fully the degree of caprice upon which nuclear safety insecurely stood in October 1962.” (154-155)
Lesson: There is an element of luck involved in avoiding accidental war.
Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
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- “The military machine is so complex that no EXCOMM can know and handle everything at once.” (p. 107)
Lesson: In crises, realize the limits of control that even competent individuals can have.
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- “We should avoid crises where we can; but that’s not always our choice.” (p. 107)
Lesson: The best way to solve crises is to avoid them.
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- “[In regard to Robert McNamara’s clash with the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations over the conduct of the blockade of Cuba], It is extraordinarily important that we do something to institutionalize what Bob McNamara did with the admirals.” (p. 107)
Lesson: Ensure civilian control over the military.
Cited in James G. Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis(New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).
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