- “With nuclear weapons, political leaders worry not about what may happen in the first phase of fighting but about what may happen in the end. As Clausewitz wrote, if war should ever approach the absolute, it would become “imperative … not to take the first step without considering what may be the last” (1976, 584). Since war now approaches the absolute, it is hardly surprising that President Kennedy echoed Clausewitz’ words during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. “It isn’t the first step that concerns me,” he said, “but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth step – and we don’t go to the sixth because there is no one around to do so” (R. Kennedy 1969, 98). In conventional crises, leaders may sensibly seek one advantage or another. They may bluff by threatening escalatory steps they are in fact unwilling to take…A conventional country enjoying military superiority is tempted to use it before other countries right the military balance. A nuclear country enjoying superiority is reluctant to use it because no one can promise the full success of a disarming strike.” (734)
Lesson: (1) In a nuclear confrontation, no country can take a first step without considering the last. (2) Nuclear deterrence works; due to the fear of nuclear retaliation, states are more cautious and will not risk escalation.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), pp. 731-745.
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