- “There are five areas which are seen as preventing us from drawing useful lessons. Why is it that some of these lessons [from 13 Days] still hold and others do not?…Because some things don’t change all that much. One of these is human psychology; people still react to stress, fear, and fatigue the way they did in the 1960s. Another is the dynamics of small-group politics; the way in which personalities and organization interests interact doesn’t change much over time. A third is the wisdom of classical diplomacy; building golden bridges behind your enemy is as valuable and as important in the nuclear age as it was in the age of the great Chinese dynasties. A fourth is the awareness of nuclear risks and the importance of the crystal-ball effect. If the Kaiser, the Czar, and the other leaders of Europe had been able to see in 1914 what the world was going to be like in 1918, there would have been no World War I; nuclear weapons provide a powerful crystalball. They did in 1962, and they do all the more in 1987.” (p. 95)
Lesson: Many of Cuban Missile Crisis’ lessons still hold because of universal conditions. What stays consistent: human psychology, small-group politics, wisdom of classical diplomacy, and “crystal-ball,” predictive effect of nuclear devastation.
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- “This suggests that that nuclear war is not likely to come from rational action, but from loss of control-and this is the central claim made by what we call “owls” in our earlier book.” (p. 95)
Lesson: Rational action won’t cause nuclear war; loss of control will.
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- “Among the lessons that owls would draw from the Cuban Missile Crisis are these: First, beware of the danger of misperceptions. Bob McNamara referred to the quarantine earlier as a signal to the Soviets. We know that it was only one among a very great number, several of which the ExComm didn’t even know about, such as the DefCon 2 order going out over an open channel Second, organizational procedures are not full controllable by small groups of men. We heard a great deal about the problems of micromanaging complex military operations such as a quarantine, ASW activities, and reconnaissance. Third, be sensitive to the risks of accident, as illustrated by the stray U-2 over Siberia. Fourth, be sensitive to the effects of stress and fatigue.” (p. 95-96)
Lesson 1: Beware of misperceptions.
Lesson 2: Organization procedures are not fully controllable by small groups of men e.g. military operations.
Lesson 3: Beware of accidents.
Lesson 4: Beware of the toll caused by stress and fatigue.
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- “Beware of being too clever by half-the uncertainties surrounding any crisis make it both impossible and unwise to craft and pursue a delicately nuanced strategy that relies heavily on your own virtuosity for success. Also, nuclear crises are different…This means that the First World War or Guns of August analogy is only valid up to a point, largely because of the crystal ball effect of nuclear weapons. Finally, a little nuclear deterrence goes a long way. The United States was deterred from taking certain actions by the prospect of just a few Soviet nuclear weapons striking the U.S., despite an overwhelming nuclear superiority….Is this effect symmetrical? In other words, if the balance had been the other way around, would th Soviets have likewise been deterred?…One last observation: the Cuban Missile Crisis does not tell us how much nuclear deterrence is enough, or what form a deterrent should take; but it does make us think twice about relying on purely conventional deterrents, because these have readily broken down in the past.” (96)
Lesson 1: Do not create overly complex plans in crises: avoid being too clever for the situation.
Lesson 2: Nuclear crises provide strong predictive power.
Lesson 3: A little nuclear deterrence can create a big effect on policy.
Lesson 4: Purely conventional deterrents are not as powerful as nuclear weapons.
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- “It suggests that both hawks and doves had a similar view about the likelihood that nuclear war would come about through rational choice, but differed in their assessments of the risks of inadvertence.” (p. 100)
Lesson: Understand sources of disagreement within one’s own camp during crises.
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- “Small actions can be misperceived in important ways, with disproportionate consequences.” (p. 250)
Lesson: Beware of even the smallest misperceptions.
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- “The more secret the plan, the more you cut yourself off from your expertise.” (p. 252)
Lesson: While conducting secret deliberations or actions during a crisis, be aware of those you may be shutting out.
Cited in James G. Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).
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- “I would say Kennedy was a pioneer in terms of using smart power. He was able to use both hard and soft power and combine them very effectively on the world stage. You need to remember that Kennedy was in office in the throes of the Cold War, at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were building up nuclear arms and fighting proxy wars in far corners of the globe. Hard power was very much on display on both sides of the Iron Curtain, but I do think that Kennedy understood that hard power alone was insufficient.”
Lesson: Leaders cannot rely on use of force alone in foreign policy decision-making.
Molly Lanzarotta, interview with Joseph Nye Jr., “Joseph Nye on JFK’s Legacy and Foreign Policy,” 2/17/11, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/publications/insight/jfk50/nye.
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- “Nuclear deterrence is far more complex than the models in the minds of most academic policy analysts. According to the prevailing models, the American advantage of seventeen to one, and the vulnerability of the Soviet forces, should have deterred Khrushchev from placing missiles in Cuba and encouraged Kennedy to take larger risks than he did. Only by looking at the psychology of real leaders in crises can we understand such anomalies.” (p. xiii-xiv)
Lesson: Models cannot fully explain decision-making: one must also account for the psychology of leaders in a given situation.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., foreword to James G. Blight, The Shattered Crystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990).
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- “Human interactions are more like loaded dice. The odds change, and the outcome of one set of events may greatly change the odds for the next event. In fact, frightening events like the Berlin or Cuban missile crisis may drive the odds of war down in their immediate aftermath.” (p. 66)
Lesson: Harrowing events like CMC leave a lasting impact on future national security decisions.
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- “President Kennedy may have believed the chances of some type of war were between one in three and one in two at the depth of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Given the American strategic advantage at that time and the prospects of limiting damage to the United States by preemptively striking Soviet nuclear forces, some strategists might conclude that Kennedy must not have believed those probabilities would lead to a nuclear exchange, or else he acted irrationally in not launching the first strike that an expected value calculation would suggest. But Kennedy may have felt that such odds were still too low to justify a preemptive strike because he still had a significant chance of avoiding any nuclear war.” (p. 75)
Lesson: Nuclear war not likely enough to justify preemptive military action.
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- “Was it worth raising the risks of nuclear war so high just to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba?…Had Kennedy allowed Khrushchev to deceive us in Cuba, might Khrushchev subsequently have miscalculated American reactions somewhere else like Berlin, and would that not have increased the probability of nuclear war? All risks must be weighed in light of alternative outcomes.” (p. 76)
Lesson: Consider risks relative to consequences of inaction or different circumstances.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1986).
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- “In cases that involve vital survival interests, we should not rule out unilateral action, though when possible we should seek international support for these actions. The starkest case in the last half century was the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. American leaders felt obliged to consider unilateral use of force, though it is important to note that President Kennedy also sought the legitimacy of opinion expressed in multilateral forums such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States.” (p. 159-60)
Lesson: Seek multilateral support whenever possible.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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- “In familiar situations, the problem may be primarily one of coordination and action…But in a novel situation, effective leadership may require greater diversity in the group that shapes decisions…In the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, John F. Kennedy followed standard bureaucratic procedures and received a predictable framework of advice. He learned from this lesson, however, and in his successful handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, he created a more diverse group and set of procedures to inform his decisions.” (p. 101-02)
Lesson: Unique situations require broader range of perspectives and options.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Powers to Lead (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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- “As the Cuban Missile Crisis showed, the costs of using military means to remove Castro were potentially enormous, including the risks of nuclear war. At the same time, given the bipolar Cold War, doing nothing could have been costly for America’s political competition with the Soviet Union. Although it is true that sanctions were not effective in removing Castro, they were an efficient means of imposing costs and containing Castro. Military action might (or might not—witness the Bay of Pigs failure) have removed Castro, but given the potential military costs, sanctions might have been the most efficient policy choice available.” (p. 73)
Lesson: Military action may be most effective option to crisis, but risks require policymakers to consider alternatives.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011).
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