- “It is remarkable how little the basic parameters of the dispute about the lessons of the Missile Crisis have changed over the past quarter-century: either there are many lessons, chiefly emphasizing the need for flexibility, managerial precision and caution in the face of great danger; or there are no lessons, because the nuclear danger of 1962 was almost surely imaginary, a function of a failure to comprehend the pivotal significance of a favorable military balance for the United States. Part of the reason for this standoff, we believe, is due to a too-easy characterization of “hawks” and “doves”—a distinction that originated during the Missile Crisis itself and continues to the present… A third group can be characterized as “owlish”… The distinguishing feature of the owlish group, which included Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and George Ball, was the weight they assigned to the risks of desperate, irrational Soviet action or to inadvertent escalation… These people recognized the glaring American strategic nuclear superiority, but saw in it as much danger as leverage…The naval quarantine represented an owlish attempt to reconcile the partial truths contained in the options favored by hawks and doves.”
Lesson: Naval quarantine, favored by the “owls”, was a way to reconcile the views of the “hawks” and “doves” – a too-easy categorization that has shaped the debate about the lessons of the crisis.
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- “Understanding one’s adversary is crucial to managing a conflict, as every stage of the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates… Perhaps the most important dimension of knowing one’s enemy is knowing his view of a crisis and what is at stake, for this largely determines which strategies are appropriate and effective, and which are not… The quarantine option, and the owlish approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis in general, was successful largely because it provided the flexibility that enabled the Administration to “learn” about its adversary as the crisis progressed.”
Lesson: It is important to understand your adversary’s view of, and desired outcome in, crises.
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- “In short, the most important lesson of the Missile Crisis a quarter-century later may be to be wary of reading from it simple lessons on crisis management.”
Lesson: Be wary of drawing simple lessons of crisis management from the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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- “The second lesson concerns the importance of the views of the top leaders who are elected and appointed… While the episode illustrates the extent to which some decision-makers are able to learn new information quickly, it equally clearly illustrates the importance and the dangers of rigidly preconceived world views and the effect they can have on the processing of new information.”
Lesson: Decision-makers’ preconceived world views affect how information is processed.
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- “A third lesson is closely related to the second: rational models of deterrence are not enough. Deterrence is not a game played by two players seated at a chess or poker table. It is played by small groups of people embedded in enormous complex organizations whose outlines they barely discern and whose detailed operations they scarcely control… what I’ll call “McNamara’s Law,” which states: “It is impossible to predict with a high degree of confidence what the effects of the use of military force will be because of the risks of accident, miscalculation, misperception and inadvertence.” In my opinion, this law ought to be inscribed above all the doorways in the White House and the Pentagon, and it is the overwhelming lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
Lesson: Rational actors can choose nuclear war: there are high risks of accident, miscalculation, or misperception that can cause it.
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- “It is critical for high-level officials to prepare themselves to deal with crises ahead of time… We need to find ways through briefings and simulations to ensure that top officials have a better grasp of the complexity of the nuclear systems they direct before a crisis occurs. On-the-job learning during a crisis is unacceptably risky.”
Lesson: It is critical to prepare top officials to deal with crises before they occur.
James G. Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch, “The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited”, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1987..