- “The relations among the members of the ExComm, their experiences on the job, and their relations to the President seem to me to be critical. These factors vary quite widely over time. Don’t lean on a single case to derive lessons for crisis management and prevention, because when we do that, we overlearn.” (p. 97)
Lesson: Learn a myriad of different cases and examples. If you focus on one case, you overlearn.
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- “Because of the changes in communication and the media and the Administration’s ability to keep things secret, imagine that the Cuban Missile Crisis had occurred today. Suppose President Kennedy had forty-eight hours to make up his mind before the story leaked. He could either choose to make up his mind in forty-eight hours or forfeit the initiative.” (p. 97)
Lesson: Be wary of leaks. They are far more likely today than in 1962.
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- “The frame of reference you bring to the issue is vital-the factors you think are important and the weight you attach to them….It’s very hard to get to nuclear war if the framework you bring to the equation is purely rational. But if irrational factors are important in your frame of reference, things look very different.” (p. 97)
Lesson: Recognize that irrational forces are at play during crises. Irrational forces can push mostly rational men to choose nuclear war.
Cited in James G. Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).
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- “Kim must be convinced that American nuclear forensics will be able to identify the molecular fingerprint of nuclear material from his Yongbyon reactor. He must feel in his gut the threat that if a nuclear weapon of North Korean origin explodes on American soil or that of a U.S. ally, the United States will retaliate precisely as if North Korea had attacked the United States with a nuclear-armed missile: with an overwhelming response that guarantees this will never happen again.
- “Here, the president can take a page from President John F. Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1962, as the Soviet Union was emplacing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba, some worried that these weapons could be transferred to a young revolutionary named Fidel Castro. Kennedy issued an unambiguous warning to Nikita Khrushchev. “It shall be the policy of this nation,” he announced, “to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” Khrushchev knew that meant a nuclear war.”
Lesson: Be serious about deterrence. America’s lack of seriousness towards DPRK has jeopardized our ability to deter them from further acquiring nuclear weapons.
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“Deterring Kim Jong-Il” (WP, 10/27/06)
- “What, then, is to be done? First and foremost, the president should not think narrowly about his options, trying to decide between going to war or allowing Iran to acquire a nuclear bomb. Obama’s challenge is to refuse the options available and invent an alternative as far outside the box as Kennedy did during the Missile Crisis.”
Lesson: During crises, consider all available options, or create your own.
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- “The first and most important lesson from the Missile Crisis for Obama is that when presented with a binary choice between unacceptable options, it is important to explore alternatives that, however unacceptable, are less catastrophic. Kennedy summarized his key take-away from the Missile Crisis this way: Success requires averting “confrontations that bring an adversary to a choice of either humiliating retreat or nuclear war.”
Lesson: If presented with unacceptable options during a crisis, create your own, new option.
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“Will Iran be Obama’s Cuban Missile Crisis?” Washington Post, March 8, 2012.
- “Instead of choosing between them, he crafted an imaginative alternative with three components: a public deal in which the United States pledged not to invade Cuba if the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles; a private ultimatum threatening to attack Cuba within 24 hours unless Khrushchev accepted that offer; and a secret sweetener that promised the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey within six months after the crisis was resolved.”
Lesson: When faced with two unacceptable options, create your own, third one.
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- “The Israeli factor makes the Iranian nuclear situation an even more complex challenge for American policy makers than the Cuban Missile Crisis was. In 1962, only two players were allowed at the main table. Fidel Castro, the Cuban prime minister, sought to become the third, and had he succeeded, the crisis would have become significantly more dangerous. Precisely because the White House recognized that the Cubans could become a wild card, it cut them out of the game. Kennedy informed the Kremlin that it would be held accountable for any attack against the United States emanating from Cuba, however it started.”
Lesson: Make sure all actors part of a crisis know the consequences of their actions.
“At 50, the Cuban Missile Crisis as Guide” (NYT, 6/15/12)
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- “Lesson One: In addressing nuclear dilemmas, military might and diplomacy are not distinct alternatives, but necessary complements. Kennedy believed that the use of military muscle should be a last resort but knew that projection of U.S. power in ways that threatened potential use of force was an essential instrument of statesmanship. For JFK, force was the hand inside the glove of diplomacy.”
Lesson: Military might and diplomacy are not mutually exclusive.
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- JFK’s successful strategy in CMC depended on imaginative diplomacy: he invented additional options short of war; presented Khrushchev with the right mix of carrots and sticks.
Lesson: When two options are unattractive, consider a broader scope of possible actions, invent additional alternatives, combining elements of both hard and soft power.
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- “Lesson Two: President Kennedy famously said, “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.” Vice President Dick Cheney articulated the Bush administration’s neocon alternative: “We don’t negotiate with evil, we defeat it.” Following that principle, the Bush administration watched as North Korea added eight bombs of plutonium to its arsenal and conducted a nuclear test. Only then did the United States resort to diplomacy…”
Lesson: Always leave the door open for negotiations and diplomacy.
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- “Lesson Three: The perfect should not be the enemy of the good. Although his ultimate goal was to bury Communism, Kennedy knew that this was a long-term project. Success would require careful small steps that avoided confrontations that could lead to a nuclear war neither country would survive…Robert Gates wrote… “Iran is not on the verge of another revolution . . . The durability of the Islamic Republic and the urgency of the concerns surrounding its policies mandate that the United States deal with the current regime rather than wait for it to fall”.”
Lesson: Distinguish between the ideal outcome in the long-term and what can be achieved in the short-term.
“Lessons from JFK on Power, Diplomacy” (Boston Globe, March 2, 2007).
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- “JFK paused to reconsider, concluding upon reflection that his first answer was not the best answer. Probing his advisers about likely Soviet responses, U.S. countermoves, and subsequent third and fourth steps in this deadly chess game, Kennedy stimulated a decision making process that invented additional options short of war… if Bush presses his point, his advisers will discover additional options.”
Lesson: Take time to consider all options before going to war.
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- “…JFK drew a cardinal lesson: Where the consequences could be catastrophic, never force an adversary to choose between humiliating retreat and war. Before today’s confrontation ends, this may prove the most valuable lesson of the Missile Crisis for Bush.”
Lesson: Give your adversary a “way out” that avoids humiliation or war.
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“Is Iraq like the Cuba Crisis? It’s Worth Bush Considering” (Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 2002)
- “As President Bush pushes ahead with his campaign proposals to simultaneously build national missile defenses and reduce strategic nuclear offensive capabilities, he should consider the lessons of the Missile Crisis…What, for example, could Russia or China do in response to U.S. missile defense? History shows that such reactions can include unlikely, unforeseen, and highly risky initiatives that pose grave dangers for America.”
Lesson: Consider how your adversary might respond to a perceived change in the status quo.
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- “Nuclear war is really possible… No event demonstrates more clearly the fateful gap between “Implausibility” and “impossibility” than the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
Lesson: How close the world came to nuclear war during the Cuban crisis should be a reminder to us today of the very real possibility of nuclear war.
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- “The principal risk of nuclear war arises from the uncontrollable. Both leaders showed a fine sense for risks beyond their control [such as those due to accidents, misperceptions, human fallibility and lack of time]”.
Lesson: Elements of chance can push two nations to the nuclear precipice.
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- “The reality of nuclear interdependence: an inescapable common interest in avoiding nuclear war… One should always ask: Who depends on whom and how much? Painful as it is for Americans, as well as for Soviets, our security is affected by their insecurity, and vice versa.”
Lesson: Nuclear powers are interdependent based on their shared interest in avoiding nuclear war.
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- “The perils of crisis management: Any one of dozens of accidents, misperceptions, personal fallibilities, or time driven choices by the Soviets or by Americans could have triggered a chain of reactions ending in war. Lesson: crisis must be prevented.”
Lessons: Avoid crises to prevent escalation to war.
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“Second Look: Lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis” (Boston Globe, October 26, 1987)
We cannot provide the full-text of the recent Foreign Affairs article by Professor Allison. However, a link with some paragraphs is here. A paraphrased list of the lessons is below.
- On Iran: the confrontation between the U.S. and Iran is like a “Cuban Missile Crisis in slow motion.
Lesson: When faced with two unacceptable options (as in the Iranian nuclear crisis), make a creative third option.
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- On North Korea: during the Missile Crisis, Kennedy signaled American resolve by publically demanding the withdrawal of the missiles. With North Korea, the United States has consistently failed to enforce any “lines in the sand”
Lesson: When you warn an adversary, make sure you back up your threats. Don’t bluff!
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- On China: during the Missile Crisis, Kennedy judged that Cuba had violated the “rules of the road” between the United States and Soviet Union established by previous crises during the Cold War.
Lesson: in the future, the United States and China need to establish their own geopolitical “rules of the road” as the two share power in Asia.
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- On national security: the lack of leaks gave EXCOMM a chance to decide how to respond to the Soviet Union. A leak of information could have compromised the decision-making process.
Lesson: Secrecy is quite important in decision-making to give time for deliberations.
“The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2012)..