• Total war makes no sense in an age where great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age where a single nuclear weapon contains almost 10 times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.”

Lesson: “A nuclear war cannot be cannot be won and must therefore never be fought.” (Often-quoted one-liner from President Ronald Reagan in 1984)

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  • “But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles — which can only destroy and never create — is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace. I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary, rational end of rational men.”

Lesson: There are better ways to peace than simply building up one’s nuclear stockpile.

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  • “We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists’ interest to agree on a genuine peace. Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy–or of a collective death-wish for the world.”

Lesson: Nuclear crisis management is too dangerous; we must therefore avoid confrontations that could force an adversary to choose between humiliating retreat or nuclear war.

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  • Let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s futures. And we are all mortal.”

Lesson: Put yourself in the shoes of your adversary. What are their common interests with you? Are there ways to resolve your differences?

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  • “[The United States and USSR] have also been talking in Geneva about our first-step measures of arm[s] controls designed to limit the intensity of the arms race and reduce the risk of accidental war. Our primary long-range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament, designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms. The pursuit of disarmament has been an effort of this government since the 1920s. It has been urgently sought by the past three administrations. And however dim the prospects are today, we intend to continue this effort — to continue it in order that all countries, including our own, can better grasp what the problems and possibilities of disarmament are.

Lesson: States must eliminate nuclear weapons.

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  • “I’m taking this opportunity, therefore, to announce two important decisions in this regard. First, Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan, and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking towards early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hope must be tempered — Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history; but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind. Second, to make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on this matter, I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so.

Lesson: A step to reducing the risk of nuclear war: banning nuclear tests.

John F. Kennedy, “American University Commencement Address” (speech at American University, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1963).

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  • “President Kennedy was disturbed by [the military chiefs’] inability to look beyond the limited military field. When we talked about this later, he said we had to remember that they were trained to fight and to wage war- that was their life. Perhaps we would feel more concerned if they were always opposed to using arms or military means…But this experience pointed out for us all the importance of civilian direction and control and the importance of raising probing questions to military recommendations.” (p. 97)

Lesson: It is important for civilians to hold reins of power during crisis and to challenge the military.

Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1969).

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  •  “Arthur Schlesinger noted that President Kennedy himself was concerned that people might draw the wrong lessons from the event — he worried especially that people would conclude: Just be tough with the Russians, and they will back down.” (p. 24-25)

Lesson: America did not win the crisis as a result of its toughness towards the Soviets.

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  • “Kennedy believed his policy had worked for three reasons. First, the United States had overwhelming local superiority; second, Soviet security was not at stake in Cuba, so they could afford to back down if necessary; and third, “they did not have a case they could plausibly sustain before the world.” (p. 25)

Lesson: The United States won Cuban Missile Crisis for three reasons: (1) The U.S. had military superiority in the Caribbean; (2) Soviet national interests were not imperiled by the crisis; and (3) case for nuclear missiles in Cuba was unsustainable in world global public opinion.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr., as cited by Ted Sorensen in in James G. Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).

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