- “I agree with Bob McNamara’s main conclusion that it’s more important to avoid crises than to plan to deal with them. I agree that it’s important to try to emphasize Soviet thinking, and to try to understand it as far as you can.” (p. 101)
Lesson: Avoid crises and try to understand adversary’s thinking.
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- “We have overstated the cautionary effect of nuclear weapons, I think, because the historical records shows that when we warn them against doing something, sometimes they back off and sometimes they do not. I didn’t believe that a Soviet move against Berlin was likely even if we had taken stronger action, partly because, despite the fact that there were the symmetries we have been talking about, we had a treaty commitment to Europe and they didn’t have a treaty commitment to Cuba.” (p. 102)
Lesson: The cautionary effect of nuclear weapons is overstated. Look at other factors that may influence an adversary’s behavior.
Cited in James G. Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).
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