- “I thought then, and still do, that under John Kennedy’s firm leadership we gave a superior performance. We did not move precipitately but argued out all available courses of action in an intellectual interchange that was the most objective I ever witnessed in government – or, for that matter, in the private sector.” (p. 309)
Lesson: Do not rush to act; take time to consider all courses of action.
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- “At the nuclear level, it was not superiority but the fact of reciprocal mortal peril that was decisive.” (p. 446)
Lesson: Nuclear superiority did not matter during the crisis; the threat of even some degree of nuclear devastation proved decisive.
The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1982).
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- “Nuclear ambition caused the crisis; a sense of nuclear affront forced the response; an awareness of nuclear danger drove both governments toward rapidity of resolution; but it was conventional superiority on the scene that determined the eventual outcome.” (p. 453)
Lesson: American conventional superiority ensured successful removal of missiles.
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“I think we could have done more than we did to discourage the conclusion that this was a case of wonderfully coordinated and error-free ‘crisis management’… It is also true that we did not ourselves understand at the time how many loose ends there were… I entirely agree with Robert McNamara, who never loses an opportunity to make the point that the only really good way to ‘manage’ such a crisis is to avoid it.” (p. 459)
Lesson: Best way to manage crisis: avoid it.
Danger and Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988).
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- “[T]here is a great deal more time pressure now, but if you…[find] a flexible first step which leaves your options open, you can deal with it because you won’t be irreversibly committing yourself right at the outset.” (p. 98)
Lesson: At beginning of any crisis, focus on limited, flexible steps.
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- “On how much [deterrence] is enough, it is interesting to note that the Missile Crisis did not spread to any of the areas we expected it to. We had a respectable but, as it turns out, wrong fear of a third Berlin crisis….The caution [the Soviets] exhibited was no doubt a function of the crystal ball effect.” (99)
Lesson: Nuclear weapons are major deterrents in any international crisis.
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- “That impulse to be very cautious is something that is becoming ingrained today. There are still people around in important positions of authority on both sides who have a collective memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis; sooner or later they will disappear, so it’s very important to keep people afraid. Even a one-in-fifty risk is too much to take, and I think you’re absolutely right, Joe, that a little deterrence goes a long way.” (99)
Lesson: As people die off who experienced the Cuban Missile Crisis, remind people of the ever-present danger posed by nuclear weapons.
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- “The most important part of crisis management is not to have a crisis, because there’s no telling what will happen once you’re in it.” (99)
Lesson: Best way to solve a crisis: avoid it.
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- “I think putting the odds of nuclear war in the Cuban crisis at one in fifty is too high….But, over the long haul, one in a thousand is too high if you aren’t steadily reducing it as you go. On the other hand, one in fifty is acceptable at one time if running the risk results in a later risk of one in a hundred, then one in a thousand, and so on. I really do think that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a massive risk reducer.” (p. 105)
Lesson: Sometimes you should pursue crises with an unacceptably high risk of nuclear war if and only if the crisis results in a later, lower risk of nuclear war.
Cited in James G. Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).
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