• The point was that the Soviets had done this thing deceitfully and surreptitiously. This was what we couldn’t accept, not the change in the balance of power.” (p. 25)

Lesson: Crises are sometimes not about power, but about whether states flout international norms.

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  • We didn’t react immediately, of course, and that’s very important. Today, the temptation is always to react immediately. If we had done that then, there’s no doubt in my mind that the crisis would have unfolded differently….Most of us felt that we had no business taking irretrievable action.” (p. 25)

Lesson: Take your time to decide a course of action.

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  • “I would like to emphasize…the importance of not taking irrevocable action. Once you get into a fixed action/reaction dynamic, you can’t predict where it’s going to go.” (p. 103)

Lesson: In crises, avoid irrevocable action. It can send things spiraling out of control.

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  • “I agree with what you said about the crystal-ball effect; it gave us an element of caution that just wouldn’t have been there if we’d been in a non-nuclear world.”  (p. 99)

Lesson: Nuclear weapons provide clear visions of effects of their use; they can inspire caution during crises.

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  • “You ask what would have happened if the crisis had occurred today? I’ll tell you what would have happened. It would have leaked quickly, that’s what. You couldn’t count on the Times to be as responsible today as it was then….Watergate changed the whole relationship between the press and the Administration, and today, with a fiercely competitive environment, the importance of being the first with the story would have overridden any sense of responsibility.” (p. 99)

Lesson: Be wary of leaks during crises. The media environment is much less “responsible” than in 1962.

Cited in James G. Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).

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