- There were real fundamental differences between the views of the hawks, including myself, and the views of those who were reluctant to take strong military actions….They had differing perceptions of the risk involved in the use of force in the nuclear age. I didn’t believe there would be any Soviet military reaction to an airstrike even if accompanied by an invasion of Cuba, because of their awareness of our military superiority. That may well be right, but we (the so-called hawks) didn’t worry about that, because we didn’t think the Russians would start anything anyway. (99-100)
Lesson: Identify the sources of disagreement on your own side during a crisis.
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- “The importance of expanding our understanding of Soviet thinking…should be an ongoing process.” (101)
Lesson: Cultivate experts on the other side. Ensure they always update their knowledge of the adversary.
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- “Don’t use force unless you are prepared to use all you’ve got.” (p. 156)
Lesson: Be wary of a gradual approach when using military force: use “all you’ve got” or do not use it at all.
Cited in James G. Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).
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