- “Khrushchev’s failure to insist on a public pledge [to swap Turkish for Cuban missiles] by Kennedy cost him dearly. Kennedy was proclaimed the big winner in the crisis because no one knew about the secret deal. Khrushchev had been humiliated into withdrawing our missiles from Cuba with no obvious gain. In fact, the terms of the final settlement were neither a great defeat nor a great victory for Kennedy or Khrushchev. Kennedy accomplished his main purpose: the restoration of the status quo ante in Cuba, although he had to accept the presence of Soviet military personnel there. Khrushchev fell short of shifting the strategic balance more in our favor, but he obtained a pledge from Washington not to invade Cuba, which had been sought by him and Castro, and withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey, which was also in our interest.” (91)
Lesson: Kennedy looked like the big winner in the crisis because Khrushchev did not demand a public missile swap, even though he got what he asked for: an American pledge not to invade Cuba and removal of American missiles from Turkey.
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- “The Soviet leadership could not forget a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation when it was forced to admit its weakness before the whole world and withdraw its missiles from Cuba. Our military establishment used this experience to secure for itself a new large-scale program of nuclear arms development.” (93)
Lesson: Many Soviets were humiliated by the way the crisis ended, which led the Soviet military establishment to begin a new large-scale nuclear weapons program to achieve strategic balance with American forces.
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- “I cannot overemphasize the vast significance of the Cuban crisis for the subsequent development of Soviet-American relations. Those days revealed the mortal danger of direct armed confrontation of the two great powers, a confrontation headed off on the brink of war thanks to both sides’ timely and agonizing realization of the disastrous consequences. It was this insight that made the political settlement possible, and a substantial role was played by a direct confidential channel between the leaders of the two countries. Even now that so many years have passed, the political and diplomatic solution at which the two states jointly arrived may be regarded as a model of successfully controlling a crisis. It showed that a third world war can be avoided.” (93)
Lesson: The crisis had a dramatic influence on subsequent Soviet-American relations. The threat of mortal danger faced by the great powers opened a path to a political settlement through confidential channels that controlled the crisis and showed that a third world war can be avoided.
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- “Those days revealed the mortal danger of a direct armed confrontation of the two great powers, a confrontation headed off on the brink of war thanks to both sides’ timely and agonizing realization of the disastrous consequences. It was this insight that made the political settlement possible, and a substantial role was played by a direct confidential channel between the leaders of the two countries. Even now that so many years have passed, the political and diplomatic solution at which the two states jointly arrived may be regarded as a model of successfully controlling a crisis. It showed that a third world war can be avoided.” (96)
Lesson: If both sides recognize a war’s disastrous consequences, they can avoid war.
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- “Both sides also were left keenly conscious of the need to ease tension. In 1963 Moscow and Washington signed a series of agreements, including a limited test ban treaty and an agreement on establishing a ‘hot line’ to communicate high-level messages directly and instantaneously between the two capitals.” (96)
Lesson: Easing tension between two adversaries with good faith agreements is crucial to avoid war.
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- “The importance of the confidential channel was proven as well. I cannot tell how the Cuban crisis would have ended if these contacts had not been there, and if it had ended badly, the consequences could have been truly disastrous. The whole experience also provided guidelines for my future diplomatic activity, which I followed for the remainder of my quarter-century as an ambassador. I tried to be an active participant in the constantly functioning confidential channel at the highest level, in order to ensure possibilities for a candid if not always present dialogue between the leaders of both countries. I venture to think that at times this appeared to be the only way of preventing the Cold War from turning into a hot one.” (96)
Lesson: Keeping a confidential channel of communication open between two powers plays a huge role in ensuring conflicts do not escalate.
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- “I find this incident has a moral for more exalted politicians: you will never agree on anything if you are already tuned in to a specific notion and cannot or will not hear the other side. This was one important lesson from the Cuban crisis.” (96)
Lesson: Compromises and open-mindedness are necessary to avoid conflict.
Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presdients (1962–1986) (New York: Random House, 1995).
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