- “The Berlin crisis-together with its culmination in the Cuban Missile Crisis-marked a turning point in the Cold War, though it was not perceived as such at the time. Had the democracies not become so consumed by their internal disputes, they might have interpreted the Berlin crisis for what it was-a demonstration of latent Soviet weakness. In the end, Khrushchev was obliged to continue to live with a Western outpost deep within Soviet territory, having failed to achieve any of the goals he had trumpeted when he launched the crisis.” (p. 593)
Lesson: American success during Missile Crisis demonstrated Soviet weakness; becoming a turning point in the Cold War.
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- “Trying to achieve in one stroke the breakthrough [on Berlin] which had eluded him for the past three years, Khrushchev had obviously calculated that, if he succeeded in that adventure, his bargaining position in an eventual Berlin negotiation would be overwhelming.” (p. 591)
Lesson: Had Khrushchev completed installation of missiles in Cuba, Soviets could have forced West Berlin to join East Germany.
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- “[Kennedy’s] bold and skillful handling of the crisis not only forced Khrushchev to withdraw the Soviet missiles but, in the process, stripped [Khrushchev’s] Berlin diplomacy of whatever credibility still remained to it.” (p. 591)
Lesson: American success over Cuba ensured Soviets could not force West Berlin to join East Germany.
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- “The cumulative result of the failure of Khrushchev’s Berlin and Cuban initiatives was that the Soviet Union did not again risk posing a direct challenge to the United States, except during a brief flare-up at the end of the 1973 Middle East War….Instead, Soviet military pressure veered off in the direction of supporting so-called wars of national liberation….” (p. 593)
Lesson: The Cuban Missile Crisis was the last time the Soviets posed a direct threat to United States (other than threats during 1973’s Yom Kippur War).
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- “[The United Nations] was irrelevant in the Cuban Missile Crisis until the two superpowers agreed to settle.” (p. 249)
Lesson: The Cuban Missile Crisis came down to successful negotiations by superpowers, not third-parties.
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
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- “Our reaction to the building of the Berlin Wall may have indicated a propensity to accept just about any fait accompli. All this may have led the Soviet leaders to the conviction that given a face-saving formula, the United States would choose retreat rather than a head-on confrontation….They failed to understand that it is highly unlikely for any man to be nominated or elected President who does not have a strong will to prevail…No President could have avoided taking action in the face of such a challenge, and the public would not have tolerated acquiescence….Perhaps the most fundamental mistake was in assessing the reason for their earlier successes….They had generally confronted the United States [in Eurasia] with ambiguous challenges whose threat to U.S. security seemed vague and remote….In Cuba, however, the Soviets chose to challenge us in the most direct and brutal fashion. Here the threat was not remote or the issue confused….The crisis could not have ended so quickly and decisively but for the fact that the United States can win a general war if it strikes first and can inflict intolerable damage on the Soviet Union even if is the victim of a surprise attack….for this crisis at least, the credibility of our deterrent was greater than theirs….The dilemma of any statesman is that he can never be certain about the probable course of events….[Assessing nature of Soviet buildup] is above all a question of the criteria of certainty by which a government operates. We shall not be able to wait everywhere for ‘hard’ intelligence about Soviet intentions.”) (p. 22-24.)
Lesson 1: Do not challenge your adversary on their vital interests. Lesson 2: Nuclear and conventional superiority were key to success in Cuban Missile Crisis. Lesson 3: Dilemma of crises is that you must sometimes act in face of uncertainty without “hard,” or definite, intelligence.
“Reflections on Cuba,” Reporter, 27:9 (November 22, 1962).
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