- Crisis highlighted the need to provide “political-diplomatic support” for strategic military deployments, something that the Soviet leadership did not do. (May 2012).
Lesson: Include individuals with different perspectives in decision-making process during crisis.
Cited in Yevgeny Podzorov, “What does the Caribbean Crisis Teach Us,” Red Star, May 18, 2012.
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- “The 1962 Cuban missile crisis is highly instructive in regards to the demands made on the system of strategic command and control at all levels, whether a supreme commander, a pilot of a reconnaissance plane, or a ship’s commander. During a nuclear conflict, the following elements are necessary: (1) firm leadership by the highest state officials without delegating, in any significant measure, their authority to lower-level officials; (2) a mechanism for crisis management, preferably developed beforehand with the participation of the top state officials, members of intelligence agencies, members of the diplomatic corps, and with the inclusion of the chain of command of the armed forces from the strategic to the tactical level; (3) the political and psychological stability of both the military leadership and those managing the crisis, which should include both hawks and doves; (4) control of the actions of the armed forces, especially those related to nuclear weapons, by reliable persons from the circle close to the highest leadership; and (5) knowledge of the decision making mechanism and patterns guiding the actions of the opposing side.” (4-5)
Lessons: (1) Necessity for firm leadership during crisis, with minimum delegation to lower-level officials; (2) Develop crisis management mechanism before a crisis occurs; (3) Need politically and psychologically stable leaders; (4) Must have control over the military; (5) Know your adversary’s decision making process.
Andrei A. Kokoshin, “Nuclear Conflict in the Twenty-first Century”, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2007-03, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 2007.
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