Anastas Mikoyan was Soviet deputy prime minister during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the spring of 1962 he opposed Khrushchev’s decision to place the nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba. In November 1962 Mikoyan was dispatched to Cuba and played a key role in convincing Fidel Castro to accept the terms on which the crisis was settled, while keeping him as Soviet ally. In particular, Mikoyan understood the danger tactical nuclear weapons posed if left in Cuban hands, and on November 22 persuaded Castro that they must be withdrawn. During this crucial meeting Mikoyan rejected Castro’s pleas to keep the tactical warheads on the island, citing a nonexistent Soviet law prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries. Had it not been for Mikoyan’s diplomatic efforts, Cuba would have become the first nuclear power in Latin America.
Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center has created this site as a resource for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Designed to help policymakers, students, and interested citizens draw lessons from these critical events half a century ago, this site not only provides background on the crisis that brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster in October 1962 but also offers tools to understand how it can inform contemporary policy.