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Thirteen Days and History
Peter Almond
Thirteen Days is a dramatization inspired by some of the events of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, benefiting from over a generation of scholarship, memoir writing, and journalism;
it represents a perspective gained by looking back at a series of critical events that
took place roughly 38 years ago. First and foremost, I would like to say that the film
is not meant to be the last word, or the first word, on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Instead,
it is a kind of evocation of the great moments of this two-week period as we best
understand them from today's vantage point. Inevitably, we have been forced to compress
events and, at times, even conflate the comments and functions of participants of the
crisis to meet the demands of a dramatic narrative. We believe, however, that this kind
of dramatic narrative imposes a responsibility upon us as filmmakers to remain faithful
to the most important themes and issues which a consensus of historians and policy experts
have identified as constituting the historical record.
It is difficult to establish absolute criteria for assessing dramatic interpretations of
history, but at the same time it is necessary to recognize that standards do exist, and
that they must be identified and served by responsible filmmakers. In the case of
Thirteen Days, the writer and producers and director were so struck by the nature of the
historical record itself that they felt it was unwise to range widely from it. The
problem was more one of effective story telling in dramatic film narrative--distilling
the powerful events and issues of the Cuban Missile Crisis in an accessible format--than
it was one of manufacturing a dramatic story. The very nature of that situation--the
pressure of a nuclear threat posed in the early years of the cold war-made our job simply
one of effectively conveying the intensity of that moment.
In terms of portraying historical personages and analyzing how the crisis was resolved,
we needed to isolate the character traits that got people into this situation and
ultimately helped them get out of it. We were inclined to stay close to the actual nature
and behavior of the key people, to focus in on a small number of them, and to make the
movie story as clear and easy to follow while simultaneously remaining consistent with
the historical record. As a result, we studied the personalities, behavior, and positions
of the President, the Attorney General, and their advisors. We tried to suggest the
Russian side of the events in the appearance of Gromyko and Dobrynin, but our main focus
was on the United States' side of the calculation. We wanted the audience to watch the
debate go back and forth among the civilian and military advisors and to track the
decision-making process. Again, the record itself was so compelling that we didn't think
that it needed much from the filmmakers.
In terms of our hopes for the film, we want to inspire the audience to learn more about
the Cuban Missile Crisis, because it contains some important lessons for today, and
because it sets a standard for how we view leadership, public leadership, in the face of
tremendous adversity. We have struggled to be faithful to the historical record, if
inspired by it to dramatize the story, but dramatized in such a way that central themes of
the crisis, the nature of leadership and its importance, the nature of the nuclear threat,
the importance of judgment in the office and person of the President the United States
accurately reflect the events of October of 1962. We hope that these key themes are
embodied in the film and that, ideally, the audience will seek information about these
important events, through web sites, testimony, transcripts, documents, and through the
scholarship and various memoirs that have been produced in the years since the crisis.
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