Thirteen Days and History

Graham T. Allison*

Thirteen Days recreates for this generation of Americans much of the reality of the most dangerous moment in human history.  It recalls vividly a confrontation in which nuclear war was really possible, reminding us of an enduring truth about the nuclear age.  It invites viewers “into the room” as a president and his advisors struggle with a seemingly intractable problem that offers no good options.  It allows the audience to experience vicariously the irreducible uncertainties, frustrating foul-ups, and paralyzing fear of failure in deciding about actions that could trigger reactions that killed 100 million fellow citizens.    

The film is not a documentary.  Rather, it is a dramatization.  Compressing Thirteen Days into 145 minutes necessitates distortion of many specific historical facts.  But the central themes of the movie and the principal “takeaways” are essentially faithful to what happened when JFK and Khrushchev stood “eyeball to eyeball” in 1962. 

My book on the Missile Crisis, Essence of Decision, offers a Roshamon-like account of the actual events, highlighting ways in which the lens through which one views the facts shapes what one sees.  As President John F. Kennedy observed with specific reference to the Missile Crisis: “the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer – often, indeed, to the decider himself… there will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process – mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.”

Co-producer Peter Almond raises the tough question about standards in cinematic dramatization.  By what standards should accuracy and fidelity in Hollywood history be judged? 

Thirteen Days’ dramatization gets a number of specific historical facts wrong:

·        inflating O’Donnell’s role to that of elder brother of President Kennedy – stiffening the president’s spine, on the one hand, while corralling military leaders bent on war, on the other;

·         caricaturing the military leadership as a war-mongering monolith;  

·        miniaturizing most of the other advisors, particularly Bundy, Sorenson, and Dillon. 

In what Charles Krauthammer has called an “ideological lie,” the movie portrays military leaders seeking to maneuver the President into war.  The image of Kevin Costner, as Kenny O’Donnell, calling pilots flying over Cuba to persuade them to lie to the chain of command for the larger good of the country is unreal.

The more important question, however, concerns the film’s central messages.  How faithful is the movie to the central truths about this historical event?  Here, I believe, the producers deserve high marks.  They have not only attempted, but succeeded in entertaining in ways that convey messages that resonate with the central truths of the crisis.

At its best the film should prick the curiosity of viewers about the actual history of the Cuban Missile Crisis and lead them to reflect on its lessons and implications.  To that end, with associates at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, I have helped create this associated web site. 

*Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and author of the best selling analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd Edition with co-author Philip Zelikow 1999).

 

 


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