LESSONS OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS   “Nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death wish for the world.”                         –John F. Kennedy, Speech at American University, 1963       Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use   The Hiroshima Peace Museum   The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum   Videos of nuclear weapons tests     JFK's Finest Hour   Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision,    Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, esp. JFK as "Analyst-in-Chief"       “President Kennedy becomes the driver of the debate. We see a president      as analyst-in-chief. On each issue, he presses his colleagues to probe      deeper implications of each option; to explore ways of circumventing      seemingly insurmountable obstacles; to face squarely unpalatable trade      offs; and to stretch their imagination.”   Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days   "20 Years After the Crisis: Reflections by the Key Participants,"    Time, September 27, 1982   Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days   Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy   Graham Allison and Richard Neustadt, "Afterward," in Thirteen Days     Critiques of John F. Kennedy's Performance   Dean Acheson, "Homage to Plain Dumb Luck" in The Cuban Missile Crisis,       "I wrote a note to President Kennedy congratulating him on his 'leadership,      firmness, and judgement over the past touchy week.' It does not detract      from the sincerity of this message to add that I also thought he had been      phenomenally lucky."   Irving Janis, Groupthink   Roger Hagan, Righteous Realpolitik   Ronald Steel, Lessons of the Missile Crisis     Analysis of Crisis Decision-Making   Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow,     Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis   Richard Smoke and Alexander L. George,     Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice   Richard Ned LeBow, We All Lost the Cold War   Eliot Cohen, "Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis,"     National Interest (January 1986)   Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble.   Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety   Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power, "Afterward"

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