Search Results for: missile crisis
Resources from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: The fiftieth anniversary of the Crisis presents an excellent opportunity to engage your students in thinking about this decisive chapter in American and world history. The original lesson plan (below) was created by Belfer Center research staff to help your students learn about the context
“We had gone to the brink, as we had vowed we would, but when we arrived at that point, instead of unsheathing our swords and striking, we stepped back and pondered the stupidity that had gotten us into such a position. With a sigh of relief, we determined that in the new era, we would
“Anyone with common sense will ask: since the rockets were introduced, why did they have to be withdrawn afterwards? And in as much as the rockets were withdrawn afterwards, why had they to be introduced before? According to you, there was a great deal of finesse in first putting them in and then taking them
“With nuclear weapons, political leaders worry not about what may happen in the first phase of fighting but about what may happen in the end. As Clausewitz wrote, if war should ever approach the absolute, it would become “imperative … not to take the first step without considering what may be the last” (1976, 584).
“…a nuclear war was possible because events could have a momentum of their own, quite apart from the conscious intent of statesmen.” (141) Lesson: Uncontrollable elements, such as accidents and miscalculations, may drive states to nuclear war. ————————————————————————– “…the highest officials in the American government clearly recognized that a confrontation with the Soviet Union would
Adlai Stevenson was Governor of Illinois, a Democratic Party presidential candidate in 1952 and 1956, and served as Ambassador to the United Nations from 1961 to 1965. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Stevenson came to Washington and joined a few of the White House sessions. He urged moderation and a diplomatic approach, instead of an
Robert Lovett was Secretary of Defense from 1951 to 1953 under President Truman, having first served as Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1950 to 1951 and overseen the Korean War mobilization. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, he joined a few of the White House sessions. Lovett argued against a surprise attack on Cuba, on the
Major Rudolph Anderson was a US Air Force pilot, killed by a Soviet surface-to-air missile on October 27 when his U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Banes, Cuba by Soviet forces under General Georgi Voronkov, who was unable to consult his superior General Pliyev and acted without Khrushchev’s approval. Anderson became the only U.S.
Dean Acheson served as Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953 in the Truman administration. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, he advised President Kennedy privately and attended meetings at the State Department, but not ExComm meetings at the White House. Acheson advocated a narrow air strike only against the missile sites, ignoring Soviet bombers and
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, a handful of officials in the United States and Soviet Union made a series of decisions that brought humanity closer to Armageddon than at any other point in history. It was also their decisions that averted nuclear war. In this section, you will find descriptions of many of the Crisis’s